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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RANAE NICOL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
WORKEFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
and WELLS FARGO BANK, 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF 
CaseNo.20120176-CA 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE BOARD'S CONTENTION THAT THE CLAIMANT "FAILED 
TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS [SIC] APPEAL" 
IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
In it's Brief, the Board argues that this court should reject the Claimant's appeal 
because Ms. Nicol failed to marshal evidence in support of the Board's decision, and cites 
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several cases which it argues support this proposition. However, the cases cited by the 
Board do not apply to the Claimant in the case at bar, as she is not challenging the 
findings of facts in this case. All of the cases cited by the Board regarding Claimant's 
duty and failure to marshal the evidence involve challenges to findings of fact. 
For example, in the case of Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the court refused to entertain factual challenges by Appellant due to a failure to 
marshal evidence. However, unlike the appellant in the Crockett case, the Claimant in this 
matter is not challenging findings of fact; it is the application of undisputed facts to the 
law that the Claimant is arguing. Indeed, Claimant begins her "Statement of the Facts" in 
the opening Brief with a statement that she does not dispute the Administrative Law 
Judge's findings of fact. 
The Board's reliance on Oneida/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse, 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is similarly misplaced. The portion of the 
decision quoted by the Board in its' brief follows: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042. 
(Italics added). This case also addressed challenges to factual findings, and is 
inapplicable to this case. 
The case of Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Commission, 191 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Utah 
App. 2008), in rejecting the argument that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence 
noted: 
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While it is true that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence, the facts are, 
for the most part, undisputed. Further, Utah Auto is not challenging the 
evidence underlying the court's decision, but the legal conclusions drawn 
therefrom. Thus, Utah Auto need not marshal. 
As in Utah Auto, the Claimant in this matter is arguing that the agency failed to properly 
apply the law to the particular facts of this case. 
This Court should determine that as Claimant stipulated to the facts as found by 
the ALJ and the Workforce Appeals Board, she had no duty to marshal the evidence, and 
should accordingly address the merits of this appeal. 
POINT II THE BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIMANT 
WAS DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE, AS THE ELEMENT 
OF CULPABILITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 
The Board argues that the employer established that the Claimant was discharged 
for just cause pursuant to R994-405-202, Utah R. Admin. R In order to establish just 
cause for a discharge, the three elements of culpability, knowledge, and control must all 
be established. Claimant asserts that the Board erred in discharging her, as the element of 
culpability was not established. Claimant relies on the case of Gibson v. Department of 
Employment Security, 840 P.2d 780, (UT App 1992), wherein the court noted that the 
"regulations defining culpability require a balancing of the employee's past work record, 
the employee's length of employment, and the likelihood that the conduct will be 
repeated, against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the employer. Id. at 784. 
The Respondent argues in its brief the Board "correctly balanced the factors in 
this case and determined that the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Employer's legitimate interests such that it necessitated her immediate discharge." 
(Respondent Brief, p. 8). The brief points to no evidence in the record or the decision to 
support the assertion that the Board "correctly balanced the factors in this case," and 
indeed there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that the Board even 
considered the factors. 
With regard to the Claimant's past work record, the length of her employment, and 
the likelihood that the conduct will be repeated, these factors are not even mentioned in 
the decision. The claim that the Board considered these factors, and after considering 
them determined that the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the 
Employer's legitimate interest such that it necessitated her immediate discharge, is not 
supported by the decision. The decision makes no reference to these factors, or to any 
other balancing of factors. The decision notes that "the Employer considers compliance 
with the policy to be such a serious matter that it discharges employees for a single 
violation of the policy." R. @ 62. 
In the case at bar, there was no actual harm to the employer. Rule 994-405-202 
(1), states that the conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. The Board 
asserts that the culpability standard does not require actual harm to the employer, only 
potential harm. Fieeiki v. Dept of Workforce Services, 122 P.3d 706 (Utah App 2005). 
However, the Fieeiki case is distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Fieeiki, the Claimant was a law enforcement officer, and had a charge of 
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domestic violence substantiated against him. Further, the court noted in the decision the 
officer was not only substantiated for domestic violence, but that had been charged with a 
violent crime. Id. at 709. The conduct of the officer in the Fieeiki case resulted with him 
being charged with a crime. Accordingly, the conduct is much more serious than the 
Claimant's single incident of reversing the fees on the account she shared with her son. 
Her testimony about the fees for the account being erroneously applied is uncontested. 
When the Claimant found the misapplied charges, she did go to the supervisor for 
guidance about the fees. R. at 35. When she brought the matter to the attention of the 
supervisor and asked whether she could reverse the charges, she was given the curious 
response to "do it at her own risk." R. at 35-36. She reversed the misapplied charges, 
and was terminated five weeks later. 
In arguing that the Claimant's conduct was so serious that discharge from her 
employment was necessary to avoid potential harm, the Respondent asserts that she 
"engaged in a dishonest, volitional act." (Respondent's Brief, p 9). There is no support 
for this characterization of the Claimant's conduct in reversing the fees. Had the conduct 
been "dishonest", would the Claimant bring the conduct to the attention of her 
supervisor? There is no mention in the decision of the Board, nor so much as a claim by 
the employer of any "dishonest" act by the Claimant. Indeed, in the Claim Report to the 
Department of Workforce Services regarding the discharge of the Claimant, the employer 
does not even answer the question regarding how the employer was harmed by the 
Claimant's actions. The space on the form is left blank. {See Exhibit 9, R. @ 009). 
5 
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The factors for determining culpability pursuant to 11-994-405-202(1), Utah R. 
Admin. P. were not properly applied in the Claimant's case. The decision of the ALJ and 
of the Board did not balance the claimant's single, isolated incident of violating a 
company policy, against the interests of the employer. The Board concluded that because 
the employer considers violation of the policy to be serious enough to justify terminating 
the employee, the violation sufficiently jeopardized the employer's rightful interests. R. 
@62. 
The employer in this matter suffered no actual harm. In reviewing the elements of 
culpability, this Court considers five factors relevant to the analysis: (1) whether the 
employee's prior pattern of behavior was consistent with the incident of misconduct; (2) 
whether the employee's actions and admission of mistake indicate that the conduct will 
not reoccur; (3) the seriousness and flagrancy of the conduct; (4) the actual and potential 
harm to the employer and public; and (5) length and strength of the prior work record. 
The evidence is uncontested that the Claimant had no prior incidents of 
misconduct at her employment. Indeed, the day she was terminated from her 
employment she was awarded a 3 rd quarter standard of excellence award from her 
employer reflecting a 100% customer satisfaction survey. R. @ 7. She had an error-free 
work record. Claimant talked to her supervisor about the erroneous charges to the 
account before she reversed the charges. When asked if she had reversed the fee, she was 
honest and admitted that she had reversed it, and indicated that she had made a mistake. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated in Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of 
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Review, 723 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), that the purpose of the Employment Security Act 
is "to provide a cushion for the shocks and rigors of unemployment. The Court has called 
for a liberal construction of the act: "mere inefficiency or failure of good performance as 
the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence, isolated instances of ordinary 
negligence, or good faith errors in judgment or decisions do not constitute culpable 
conduct which precludes a discharged employee from receiving unemployment 
compensation benefits. Id. at 429-430. 
Claimant's conduct was a violation of her employer's policy, but it was a single 
incident of poor judgment. She had no intent of causing harm to her employer, and the 
employer in fact was not harmed, and did not claim any potential or actual harm. She 
sought the advise of a supervisor before reversing the fees, only to be given the response 
to "do it at your own risk." R. at 39. 
The Claimant asserts that when balanced, these factors support the conclusion that 
the element of culpability has not been established. The Board's application of the law to 
the facts of this case finding culpability, particularly when the act is to be liberally 
construed, is not within the realm of reasonableness and rationality, and this Court should 
reverse the decision of the agency. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, this Court should consider the merits of this appeal as the facts are 
uncontested and therefore Claimant had no obligation to marshal the evidence. This Court 
should reverse the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board concluding that culpability 
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had been established, and award benefits to the Claimant. 
Dated this ft? day of November, 2012. 
S; 
Attorney for Appellant 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this / / day of November, 2012,1 mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Reply Brief to: 
JACESON MAUGHAN 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45244 ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0224 \ / 
y/'i/i 
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RANAE NICOL, 
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
WORKEFORCE APPEALS BOARD, 
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REPLY BRIEF 
CaseNo.20120176-CA 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE BOARD'S CONTENTION THAT THE CLAIMANT "FAILED 
TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS [SIC] APPEAL" 
IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
In it's Brief, the Board argues that this court should reject the Claimant's appeal 
because Ms. Nicol failed to marshal evidence in support of the Board's decision, and cites 
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several cases which it argues support this proposition. However, the cases cited by the 
Board do not apply to the Claimant in the case at bar, as she is not challenging the 
findings of facts in this case. All of the cases cited by the Board regarding Claimant's 
duty and failure to marshal the evidence involve challenges to findings of fact. 
For example, in the case of Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the court refused to entertain factual challenges by Appellant due to a failure to 
marshal evidence. However, unlike the appellant in the Crockett case, the Claimant in this 
matter is not challenging findings of fact; it is the application of undisputed facts to the 
law that the Claimant is arguing. Indeed, Claimant begins her "Statement of the Facts" in 
the opening Brief with a statement that she does not dispute the Administrative Law 
Judge's findings of fact. 
The Board's reliance on Oneida/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse, 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is similarly misplaced. The portion of the 
decision quoted by the Board in its' brief follows: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042. 
(Italics added). This case also addressed challenges to factual findings, and is 
inapplicable to this case. 
The case of Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Commission, 191 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Utah 
App. 2008), in rejecting the argument that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence 
noted: 
2 
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While it is true that Utah Auto failed to marshal the evidence, the facts are, 
for the most part, undisputed. Further, Utah Auto is not challenging the 
evidence underlying the court's decision, but the legal conclusions drawn 
therefrom. Thus, Utah Auto need not marshal. 
As in Utah Auto, the Claimant in this matter is arguing that the agency failed to properly 
apply the law to the particular facts of this case. 
This Court should determine that as Claimant stipulated to the facts as found by 
the ALJ and the Workforce Appeals Board, she had no duty to marshal the evidence, and 
should accordingly address the merits of this appeal. 
POINT II THE BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIMANT 
WAS DISCHARGED FOR JUST CAUSE, AS THE ELEMENT 
OF CULPABILITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 
The Board argues that the employer established that the Claimant was discharged 
for just cause pursuant to R994-405-202, Utah R. Admin. P. In order to establish just 
cause for a discharge, the three elements of culpability, knowledge, and control must all 
be established. Claimant asserts that the Board erred in discharging her, as the element of 
culpability was not established. Claimant relies on the case of Gibson v. Department of 
Employment Security, 840 P.2d 780, (UT App 1992), wherein the court noted that the 
"regulations defining culpability require a balancing of the employee's past work record, 
the employee's length of employment, and the likelihood that the conduct will be 
repeated, against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the employer. Id. at 784. 
The Respondent argues in its brief the Board "correctly balanced the factors in 
this case and determined that the seriousness of the offense sufficiently jeopardized the 
3 
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Employer's legitimate interests such that it necessitated her immediate disc!large." 
(Resp i. K • i: ! no evidei K I or the decision to 
support the assertion that the Board "correctly balanced the factors in this case," and 
indeed there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that the Board even 
considered the factors. 
With regard t< > tl u ; Claii i lai it's past work record, the length of her employment, and 
the likelihood that the conduct will be repeated, these factors are not even mentioned in 
the decision. The claim that the Board considered these factors, and after considering 
them determined tlui (lit »mui isness of the offense sufficiei ilh icopurdized tl ic 
Employer's legitimate interest such that it necessitated her immediate discharge, is not 
supported by the decision. The decision makes no reference to these factors, or to any 
other balancing of factors. The decision notes that "the T •- . , ver considers compliance 
with tl le polic > b 3 be • si ic 1 1 a set i< )i is i i latter that it discharges employees for a single 
violation of the policy." R. @ 62. 
In the case at bar, there was no actual harm to the employer. Rule 994-405-202 
(1 )„ states th. -act causii ig tl ic disci lai ge i i n isl be so serioi is that coi itii n iii lg tl le 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. The Board 
asserts that the culpability standard does not require actual harm to the employer, only 
potential 1: lan i i Fieeiki v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 122 [ > 3c 1 706 (I ftal i \ pi 2005). 
However, the Fieeiki case is distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Fieeiki, the Claimant was a law enforcement officer, and had a charge of 
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domestic violence substantiated against him. Further, the court noted in the decision the 
officer was not only substantiated for domestic violence, but that had been charged with a 
violent crime. Id. at 709. The conduct of the officer in the Fieeiki case resulted with him 
being charged with a crime. Accordingly, the conduct is much more serious than the 
Claimant's single incident of reversing the fees on the account she shared with her son. 
Her testimony about the fees for the account being erroneously applied is uncontested. 
When the Claimant found the misapplied charges, she did go to the supervisor for 
guidance about the fees. R. at 35. When she brought the matter to the attention of the 
supervisor and asked whether she could reverse the charges, she was given the curious 
response to "do it at her own risk." R. at 35-36. She reversed the misapplied charges, 
and was terminated five weeks later. 
In arguing that the Claimant's conduct was so serious that discharge from her 
employment was necessary to avoid potential harm, the Respondent asserts that she 
"engaged in a dishonest, volitional act." (Respondent's Brief, p 9). There is no support 
for this characterization of the Claimant's conduct in reversing the fees. Had the conduct 
been "dishonest", would the Claimant bring the conduct to the attention of her 
supervisor? There is no mention in the decision of the Board, nor so much as a claim by 
the employer of any "dishonest" act by the Claimant. Indeed, in the Claim Report to the 
Department of Workforce Services regarding the discharge of the Claimant, the employer 
does not even answer the question regarding how the employer was harmed by the 
Claimant's actions. The space on the form is left blank. {See Exhibit 9, R. @ 009). 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The factors for de te rmin ing culpabil i ty pursuant to R-994-4Q5-202(Th Utah R . 
Admin. P. w ere i not pi operly apj )lied ii :i tl ic Ch lii t u u it's case. Tl le dec ision of the ALJ and 
of the Board did not balance the claimant's single, isolated incident of violating a 
company policy, against the interests of the employer. The Board concluded that because 
the employer considers violation oftl ic j: >olic y tc » be serious enoi igl i. to ji istify tei it nil lating 
the employee, the violation sufficiently jeopardized the employer's rightful interests. R. 
@ 6 2 . 
The employer in this matter suffered no actual harni Iii reviewing the elements of 
culpability, tl. , • • - lers five factors relevant to tl ic ai lalysis: (1) whetl iei: tl :te 
employee's prior pattern of behavior was consistent with the incident of misconduct; (2) 
whether the employee's actions and admission of mistake indicate that the conduct will 
not reoccur; (3) the seriousness and flagrancy of the condi ict; ( 4) the acti lal ai id potei itial 
harm to the employer and public; and (5) length and strength of the prior work record. 
The evidence is uncontested that the Claimant had no prior incidents of 
misconduct at her employment. Indeed, the day she was terminated from her 
ei i lployi i lent she was awarded a 3rd qt i< titer slam ' >f excel lence award froi it I I I sr 
employer reflecting a 1 0 0 % cus tomer satisfaction survey. R. @ 7. She had an error-free 
work record. C la imant ta lked to her supervisor about the er roneous charges to the 
accou *'-<Mr- ^ v reversed tl le • el larges When asked if ^ •. ••• ^ - :is 
honest and admit ted that she had reversed it, and indicated that she had m a d e a mis take. 
The Utah Supreme Cour t has indicated in Logan Regional Hospital v. Board of 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Review, 723 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986), that the purpose of the Employment Security Act 
is "to provide a cushion for the shocks and rigors of unemployment. The Court has called 
for a liberal construction of the act: "mere inefficiency or failure of good performance as 
the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence, isolated instances of ordinary 
negligence, or good faith errors in judgment or decisions do not constitute culpable 
conduct which precludes a discharged employee from receiving unemployment 
compensation benefits. Id at 429-430. 
Claimant's conduct was a violation of her employer's policy, but it was a single 
incident of poor judgment. She had no intent of causing harm to her employer, and the 
employer in fact was not harmed, and did not claim any potential or actual harm. She 
sought the advise of a supervisor before reversing the fees, only to be given the response 
to "do it at your own risk." R. at 39. 
The Claimant asserts that when balanced, these factors support the conclusion that 
the element of culpability has not been established. The Board's application of the law to 
the facts of this case finding culpability, particularly when the act is to be liberally 
construed, is not within the realm of reasonableness and rationality, and this Court should 
reverse the decision of the agency. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, this Court should consider the merits of this appeal as the facts are 
uncontested and therefore Claimant had no obligation to marshal the evidence. This Court 
should reverse the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board concluding that culpability 
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had been established, and award benefits to the Claimant. 
I );ilal this / ^ ^ d a y of Noveniba 2012. 
^ 
S$h NfPappas 
^Attorney for Appellant 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this / / day of November, 2012,1 mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Reply Brief to: 
JACESON MAUGHAN 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45244 _ 
Salt Lake City, I Jiah .N4 I 4 S -1)224 \ / 
v 
K/yl 
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